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JUN 21 1965

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COVER PAGE: - Picture and accompanying text, as reprinted below appeared in the Dec, 2603 (1943) issue of SHIN SEIKI (New Era). This Japanese magazine was published in the PHILIPPINES in English and Tagalog, and has served as one of the vehicles of Jap propaganda among the Filipinos. -

"THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR has not stopped Nippon from holding her annual Physical Training Meets culminating on November 3, birthday anniversary of the great Emperor MEIZI (sic). This year's grand meet at the MEIZI Shrine was Nippon's 14th, her second since the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War. To participate in this great sporting spectacle, thousands of stalwart youths from JAPAN and hundreds from various countries of the Greater East Asia Sphere assembled at the vast MEIZI Shrine stadium in TOKYO. But unlike physical competitions in the Occident in which sectional or personal glory is the aim, those in JAPAN are performed in the spirit of physical fitness for the glory of the nation. Accordingly, the games competed in and the mass drills performed at the MEIZI Shrine have the purpose of making the citizens physically and spiritually fit for War."

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No 10 - 19 Feb 45

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Do Not Incite Allies to Use Gas

(From ATIS Bulletin No 1698, 12 Jan 1945)

Taken at JAOR, LEYTE, 4 Nov 44, was a bound mimeographed file of operation orders, 17 Jan - 8 Oct 44, issued by 16 Division, entitled "Do not incite the Allies to use gas." Brief extracts follow:

"The Division will consider the use of poison gas by the enemy and will hasten preparations for chemical warfare.

"In view of the influence which chemical warfare will have on all operations, you must be extremely careful in the preservation of secrecy. This is a strict warning to be most cautious not to start a chemical war by inciting the enemy.

"The use of poison gas everywhere by the enemy should be considered, and in order to combat this you should immediately take protective measures; also perfect your preparations in the use of smoke.

"The training of each unit in protection against gas and in the use of smoke is to be completed by the end of April."

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Japanese Non-Metallic Booby Traps

It has recently been confirmed that booby traps made of coconuts are being used by the Japanese in the Arakan region of BURMA. The coconut booby traps were said to lack explosive directional control but were considered powerful enough to blow the tread off a tank or the wheel from a jeep. They could not, however, blow off the wheel of a truck.

In the Dec 14th issue of the Ceylon Daily News, a short article appeared. It is quoted:

"An A.P.I. (Associated Press of INDIA, but not connected with American A.P) War Correspondent writes: The Japanese are now using exploding coconuts in jungle warfare as mines and hand grenades. Two large dumps were found in KALEWA and it is reported that they have also been used in LEYTE. Each consists of a hollowed coconut husk filled with a picric acid detonator fixed in the top (sic) which explodes on contact with the trip wire. The importance of this weapon is that it is impossible to detect its presence by the ordinary metallic detectors, as no metal is used in its construction and the coconut is the commonest article in the jungle. The explosive charge is enough to blow off a jeep's wheel or a man's leg." (USAFPOA G-2 Intelligence Bulletin #7, 1 Jan 45, records the Japs' device of imbedding a hand grenade in a coconut, and using as a camouflaged mine.)

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Japanese Spear Attacks

Numerous instances have been reported of Japanese attacks in which the participants carried sharpened bamboo spears or bamboo poles with knives or bayonets affixed. These weapons were used to arm men for whom no better weapon could be supplied.

It is interesting to note that, at least in one instance, the tactics and technique of fighting with bamboo spears has been prescribed. A mimeographed file of operation orders of the KAKI Force (16th Division) captured on LEYTE and published by ATIS SWPA contains the following notes on spear fighting:

"Experience gained at LUMBAN, LAGUNA Province (LUZON, P.I.) shows that in killing with bamboo spears, the chest is a very difficult spot to stab because of the ribs. The stomach, however, was found to be a most vulnerable spot."

The document then proceeds to prescribe the method of attack by a group armed with spears. When the group has advanced to within throwing distance of the enemy part of the group will throw their spears, and the remaining Japs will immediately rush in and stab the enemy. An explanation is given in which the right half of the attacking group is the spear-throwing group, while the left half is designated as the assault group.

The following caution is added apparently as a precaution to prevent the entire group from throwing their spears, leaving no one armed to close with the enemy:

"Be sure to provide a leader and have instructions given beforehand. At least half of the men will carry bamboo spears and it should be planned so that the entire group will not become unarmed."

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Japanese Lunge Mine

(From Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 69, 20 Dec 44)

A new threat to our tanks and tank crews has been devised by the fanatical Japanese. The Japanese Lunge Mine, a suicide anti-tank weapon, has been found on LEYTE and attempts to use it have been reported. The name "Lunge Mine" given to this weapon by the Japanese means that the operator literally lunges forward with the mine.

Information as to construction, methods of employment, and other data on this mine, are revealed in a document captured at CALUBIAN, LEYTE, on 13 Dec 1944. Pertinent information from the translation is quoted here:-

"General information:- The Lunge Mine (hereafter, this term will be abbreviated and referred to as Mine) is a conical-shaped mine with a wooden handle and is thrust against tanks. It is a suicide anti-tank mechanism which is capable of penetrating armor-plating up to a thickness of 100mm (4 inches) killing or injuring the occupants and damaging the internal equipment.

"Compared to the same amount of ordinary explosives, this mine has the following advantages; it not only has a greater penetrating power, but it explodes downward and to the sides, and the danger to the persons in the rear is comparatively small.

"Description:- The fougasse of this lunge mine is located in front of the handle. The fougasse contains the powder charge and the detonator, and it has a cavity inside which is peculiar to this mine. The powder charge and the cavity are separated by a metal funnel. It contains about 3 kg (6.6 lb) of brownish-powdered charge.

"The detonator is attached at the top. At the top, a cover prevents the explosive charge from becoming moist and from leaking. In order to increase the penetrating power, there are three legs attached at the bottom, and the mine must be made to explode as close as possible to the armor plate.

"The wooden handle is $1\frac{1}{2}$ meters (59 inches) long and has a striker at the end. It has a cylinder which screws on the fougasse. In order to insure safety while carrying, there is a safety pin and a holding pin (the holding pin prevents possible explosion by shock caused by the weight of the fougasse and vibrations while carrying). The holding pin is made of copper wire, 0.9 to 1 cm (.39 inches) in diameter or of steel wire, 0.7 to 0.8 cm in diameter. Attach the handle to the fougasse. Pull the safety pin out. If the object is struck with sufficient force, the holding pin will cut and the striker will move forward to the detonator and set the mine off.

"The weight of the fougasse is approximately 5 kg (11 lbs). The weight of handle mechanism is approximately 1.5 kg. The total is approximately 6.5 kg.

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JAPANESE LUNGE MINE (CONTD)

"Precautions in use and handling:- When the mine is assembled, hold the fougasse level and to the front, and grip the cylinder. While approaching the enemy, in order to lunge forward, pull the safety pin out and use bayonet tactics to prevent the fougasse from vibrating. Do this by holding the center of the handle as near as possible to its extremity. When lunging forward, thrust the handle forward with sufficient force to insure certain explosion. However, make contact squarely. Considerable skill is necessary in the lunging operation due to the weight of the mine. Best method is to make a suicide attack; therefore without losing footing, make contact squarely....

"Capabilities:- The results of the experiments in MANILA were that when head-on contact is made, steel plates of 150 mm (6 inches) thickness can be penetrated. When contact at an angle of 60 degrees is made, steel plates of 100 mm (3.9 inches) thickness can be pierced.

"The results of the experiments in JAPAN showed that this mine, with 2 kg (4.4 lbs) of explosives, can penetrate up to 150 mm (6 inches) of steel plates, regardless of the type of powder charge, method of packing, method of ignition, etc.



"This type of mine is just as effective against a bomb-proof (bullet-proof) steel plate. This mine can be directed against the side of a tank hull of an American Type M-4 medium tank with an armor plating of 40-45 mm (1.5-1.75 inches) in thickness. This mine is quite effective even against Type M-1 heavy tanks with an armor plating of 70-80 mm (2.7-3.1 inches) in thickness....

All attempts by Jap soldiers to use the Lunge Mine against our tanks thus far have been reported as unsuccessful. Our tank crews are prepared to cope with tactics of such unreasonable zeal. They find that hand grenades are most handy to pitch ahead of their moving tanks into ditches, foxholes, or other hiding places, in which the die-for-the-Emperor Jap soldier may be lurking with his Lunge Mine.

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3-Kg LUNGE MINE

CROSS SECTION OF LUNGE MINE

Scale $\frac{1}{2}" = 1"$

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More on Japanese Balloons

(From Supplemental Report No. 2, WD, MID, Washington, D.C., 22 Jan 45 and Annex No. 3 to G-2 Periodic Report, Hq Western Defense Command, San Francisco, Calif., 3 Feb 45)


USAFPOA G-2 Intelligence Bulletin No.9, 2 February 1945 carried an article dealing with landings and discoveries of balloons evidently of Japanese manufacture. Since then additional reportings of such airborne objects and analyses of balloons or fragments of balloons have all contributed to the total of intelligence available on the subject.

There have been numerous reports of sightings of airborne objects and findings of fragments of paper which could have been portions of balloon envelope. Evidence favors the theory that the primary purpose of the free balloons is to provide a means for attacking the continent of North America. The methods of attack which are believed to have been used so far are small HE bombs and small incendiaries; there is no definite proof that other possible agents have yet been used. Because of the fact that both the envelope and carriage of the balloon have destructive charges, and because of the difficulty of seeing the balloon at great altitudes, it is possible that only a small percentage of the balloons which have landed have been reported. The great dispersion of the landings indicates that the balloons are being released at a great distance from the U.S., probably JAPAN or CHINA.

A balloon recovered 14 Nov 44 was examined in detail and found to be quite similar to others previously recovered. It was a free balloon carrying a ring device, barometrically controlled, for the purpose of dropping articles to maintain altitude. Whether the objects so dropped were ballast or bombs or both has not yet been determined, as none of these objects from this balloon has been recovered. Following is an extract from the NRL report, describing the operation of this balloon: -

"The cycle of operation would be as follows. On the ground the barometric contacts would be closed but no action would occur because all of the trigger switches are open. When the balloon is released the two long fuses are lighted. They burn through in about 35 minutes and blow out their terminal plugs closing the first pair of switches. By this time the balloon is above 20,000 feet and rising so the barometric contacts are open and no further action occurs. When the balloon reaches a maximum altitude and then falls enough to close one of the barometric contacts, the first pair of plugs in the rim is fired allowing ballast to drop and lighting the fuses leading to the number 2 pair of trigger switches. These fuses require about 2 minutes to burn through and blow out their terminal plugs closing the second pair of trigger switches. If the balloon has in the meantime ascended enough to open the barometric contacts, no further action occurs. If the balloon has not risen enough the second pair of rim plugs blows out dropping a second portion of ballast and lighting the fuse to the number 3 trigger switches. When the number 36 pair of trigger switches closes and one of the barometric contacts closes, the fuse leading to the envelope is ignited to destroy the envelope. The unused number 1 barometric contactor and unused fuse igniter connected to it could be used to destroy the envelope if the balloon fell below a set altitude at any time.

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MORE ON JAPANESE BALLOONS (CONTD)

"Tied to the bottom of the assembly are four pieces of twine, one of which has a one-foot length of light steel wire attached. These pieces may have been used to fasten on additional gear or to hold arming wires. The weight of this additional gear could be as much as 50 pounds or more, but in view of the fact that rope used elsewhere in the assembly is many times as strong as necessary, it is presumptive that any additional gear tied on did not exceed ten pounds.

"The objects released from the balloon could obviously be either inert ballast or some incendiary or similar device, or both. Release of the objects may be the primary purpose of the device. On the other hand it may have carried radiosonde equipment or some sort of plane detection or interference equipment, and the release of ballast is incidental to keeping the balloon aloft for a considerable period.

The presence of automatic ballast release equipment increases the possibility that the balloons are coming from a considerable distance, perhaps from JAPAN itself.

The purpose of the self destructive feature is apparently to avoid recovery of the equipment by the Allies or to avoid detection of the operation. This slightly favors the theory that radiosonde or plane detection equipment, rather than incendiaries are involved. It is still in the realm of possibility that the ballast units might contain insect pests, disease germs, or the like.

The laboratory has just received fragments of a fourth paper balloon from Sebastopol via Fort Lewis, Washington. Preliminary examination indicates that this was identical in all respects, including the ballast release gear, to the other three paper balloons. With this gear were received the remains of three small incendiary charge containers.

The whole assembly of paper balloon, shrouds, shock absorber, and release gear are apparently a standard Japanese item. On the next page is a sketch of the whole assembly. This will be referred to in any further reports as the "standard Japanese paper balloon".

Japan's War In China

(From 14th Air Force Intelligence Summary
10 January 1945)

During the months of November-December, 1943, parts of seven Japanese divisions engaged in an offensive campaign directed against the city of CHANGTEH, southeast of TUNGTING Lake. Very effective Fourteenth Air Force air operations in combination with slow, stubborn Chinese ground defense exacted high Japanese casualties. Japanese columns, not seriously pressed in retreat, withdrew to their YANGTZE River bases. Had the Japanese been able to hold and control CHANGTEH, with its undeveloped air facilities and its net work of roads and waterways, for a cheap expenditure of men and material, they would have done so. They failed in fulfilling this objective, but they gave parts of seven divisions combat training and they seized large quantities of rice.

Early 1944 saw the Japanese controlling positions at the yellow River Bulge, and in the HONGKONG-CANTON area of occupation which they had acquired during 1938-1939. During February and March 1944 the Japanese set in motion a program of supply accumulation and troop reinforcement in these three base areas. These were the initial moves in the Japanese Campaign for East China. Both in preparation and in execution, this campaign clearly aimed for the accomplishment of major strategic objectives at the least possible cost in men and material. Japanese strategists had learned that in CHINA employment of small forces invited Chinese guerrilla resistance and increased risks of air attrition. In consequence a military mass exceeding minimum requirements by possibly as much as three to four times was assembled and successively deployed in such a manner as to prevent congestion in attractive air target areas and yet to achieve effective numerical superiority over Chinese infantry at all active combat fronts.

Japan's strategic objectives included:

1. Establishment of an overland transport route, secure and continuous, from Korea-Manchuria-North China-Central China to French Indo-China.
2. Elimination of Fourteenth Air Force forward operating bases from which Japanese shipping had been effectively attacked and Formosa continuously threatened.
3. Establishment of military and air dominance over the entire length of the south China Coastal hinterland into which American naval and amphibious operations might penetrate.
4. Elimination of the Chinese army as a military force having any offensive capability.
5. Demoralization of the Chinese Central Government joined in military alliance with the United Nations.
6. Stimulation of Japanese morale at home by publishing triumphs on the China front.

JAPAN'S WAR IN CHINA (CONTD)

In short, the Japanese, placed on the defensive by American naval victories in their overseas island empire and by unrelenting air and submarine attrition against their sea lanes, became engaged in a major attempt to enlarge and strengthen their inner continental zone of defense from an area whose southern limits lay at the Yellow River Bend, and along the Yellow River to an area encompassing all of East China.

In April, 1944, some five Japanese divisions drove south of the Yellow River. Supported by the most impressive accumulation of armor ever brought into China, this force occupied the LINGHAN Railway Zone, running north and south, and an important segment of the LUNGCHAI Railway Zone running east and west. The Fourteenth Air Force inflicted heavy damage upon concentrations of Japanese armor. Nevertheless, in less than eight weeks, the Japanese had completed the first phase of their East China Campaign. They immediately undertook reconstruction of a north-south railway line.

Late in May, some 10-12 Japanese divisions were committed to an offensive drive aimed at CHANGSHA and HENGYANG, south of the important Japanese bases at HANKOW and YOCOW. Not until the main Japanese force piled up around HENGYANG itself was there effective Chinese resistance. The Chinese garrison at HENGYANG put up a heroic defense. Chinese armies, attempting to relieve HENGYANG fought on many sectors with determination and gallantry. Skillful tactical employment of superior equipment enabled the Japanese to lure into a grinding trap some of China's most experienced troops. The Chinese attempt to relieve HENGYANG reduced the combat capabilities of the Ninth War Area to little more than a complex of organized guerrilla bands. Japanese occupation of HENGYANG ended another phase of their East China Campaign. During this phase they were taught by the Fourteenth Air Force the risks of congestion in siege of a fixed Chinese defense point; the vulnerability of waterborne supply movements; and the dangers of open country daylight movement by Japanese personnel or motor transport.

Following the occupation of HENGYANG the Japanese regrouped for further drives south and southwest. On September 4 they occupied the Fourteenth Air Force airfield at LINGLING and subsequently pushed deliberately southwest along the railway zone. They by-passed Chinese positions and did not attempt to storm Chinese defense even where those defenses were known to be weak.

During the period of redeployment and tentative attack southwest of HENGYANG and LINGLING, the Japanese set in motion a determined drive west from the CANTON-HONGKONG bases. Movement followed the course of the West River. The Japanese did not give clear indication of whether they intended to drive northwest on LIUCHOW or NANNING. Chinese units in the KWEILIN-LIUCHOW area hastily were drawn southwest into the West River area, moving indecisively. The Chinese spread themselves over a wide arc. At KWEIPING sufficient Chinese strength finally was concentrated to attempt a counterattack. On this sector the Fourteenth Air Force funneled the densest application of air attack in its history. Chinese troops, though excited and encouraged by this assistance, failed to exploit its contribution to offensive operations. The Japanese permitted the Chinese attack to expire and then drove back the advancing columns.

JAPAN'S WAR IN CHINA (CONTD)

Meanwhile the Japanese let loose their attack on KWEILIN. Employing a wide, swift flanking tactic in combination with a hard frontal punch on 10 November, KWEILIN was occupied. On 11 November, LIUCHOW was occupied. Chinese armies operating in the Fourth War Area were so widely dispersed, and so infected by the mood of failure and ineffectuality that solid defense could not be established on any sector of the offensive operations developing around KWEILIN, around LIUCHOW and westwards towards NANNING. In quick succession fields at HENGYANG, PAOCHING, LINGLING and TANCHUK, were seized by the Japanese.

Having occupied LIUCHOW and NANNING on 11 and 23 November, the Japanese quickly perceived that effective Chinese military organization in the Chinese Fourth War Area was virtually non-existent. They moved northwest of both towns, into ISHAN and into the LUNGAN area, to establish defensive outpost strongholds. And, from the very great mass of strength which had assembled in the ISHAN-NANNING-WUCHOW triangle, they detached flying cavalry and mobile infantry columns which swept deep into Chinese territory. Cutting into pieces remaining Chinese units, looting and destroying and at various points dismantling the railway line between LIUCHOW and TUYUN, these small Japanese forces produced profound panic amongst Chinese military authorities who were able to see only that the Japanese were threatening the KUNMING-CHIHKIANG Highway, CHUNGKING and KUNMING, but were unable to assess the weight or real intent of the Japanese advances. Within 65 miles of KWEIYANG the Chinese established, finally, defense positions. After fleeting contact with these Chinese defenders, the Japanese, suffering from unseasonably bitter cold and outrunning improvised supply lines, began a swift withdrawal. The Chinese were unable to exploit the Japanese retreat. At HOCHIH and ISHAN the Japanese stood fast, even though their numerical strength was small.

As the year 1944 ended, the Japanese south of the YANGTZE River had assembled over 300,000 troops, including some of their best combat divisions, artillery and armored motor equipment. They had established a secure transport zone from north CHINA to French INDO-CHINA; had, in fact, started movement of supplies and troops both north from TONKIN and south into TONKIN. They had isolated the Third and Seventh War Zones from West CHINA military supply bases. They had chewed up the forces of the Chinese Ninth War Area so severely that their combat capabilities were reduced to conduct of guerrilla operations. They had thoroughly demoralized the military organization of the Chinese Fourth War Area. They had severely discredited the military authority of the Ministry of War of the Chinese Central Government and inflicted a profound blow to its political prestige. They had occupied, and begun to employ as their own, eight well developed Fourteenth Air Force airfields. The Japanese had reduced the tactical importance of other East CHINA Fourteenth Air Force airfields through enforcing their supply by air transport alone.

In late December, 1944, the Japanese Army organization in South and East CHINA was reported to have been enlarged. Headquarters of a group army were set up at HENGYANG, comprising three armies with headquarters at LIUCHOW, HENGYANG and HANKOW. Simultaneous with the withdrawal of their cavalry columns from the KWEIYANG sector, a major reorientation of Japanese mass was set in motion. New key areas of concentration developed north of the West River, east of KWEILIN, and in the HENGYANG area. This redeployment of strength appeared to support Chinese apprehensions that the Japanese early in 1945 planned to seize the entire length of the CANTON-HANKOW railway; probably planned to capture the Fourteenth Air Force-air-supplied bases at SUICHUAN and KANCHOW; and possibly planned to capture the Fourteenth Air Force air-drome west of PAOCHING at CHIHKIANG.

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Jap Machine Gun Tactics

(From Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 69, 20 Dec 44)

The CO, 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, reports that the Japs sight Machine Guns so as to cover our positions and then, when artillery is laid on the Japs, they get into deep foxholes on a reverse slope and continue to fire the guns by means of a string attached to the trigger. They observe our troops without exposing themselves by using a periscope. He also reported that they pin our troops to their foxholes with MG fire and then raise the trajectory so their troops can creep under it. Our troops have a tendency to stay down at this time although the fire is overhead.

Jap Miscellany

(From Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 70 27 Dec 1944)

The following items are miscellaneous bits of information gleaned from recent interrogations and documents:

Post-war JAPAN: "PW said it is rumored among soldiers and civilians alike that if AMERICA wins the war, all except 2,000 Japs will be slaughtered. JAPAN will be turned into an international park using the 2,000 as guides. These guides will be 2,000 of the prettiest Jap girls, around seventeen years of age."

Suicide by Tongue-Biting: "PW was weak from hunger and was wounded in the chest. He was unconscious at time of capture. The night before he was interrogated, PW attempted to commit suicide by biting his tongue in half. However, the pain became too great for him to stand and he gave up the attempt. PW talked freely...."

"PW was advancing in a grove when the concussion from a shell knocked him unconscious. When he recovered he was captured. The PW was going to commit suicide by biting off his tongue, but after seeing an interpreter he changed his mind."

The Home Front: "PW says the home front situation has deteriorated badly during the past year. Food is inadequate, and luxuries such as candy and sugar are obtainable in small quantities perhaps once in forty days. There is in addition an acute shortage of all types of medicine. Substitutes are being used with increasing regularity."

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Finned Bangalore Torpedo

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(From ATIS, SWPA Enemy Publications No. 301
21 Jan 1945)

The following is extracted from a translation of an enemy document captured at MAFFIN, 28 May 1944.

"Use: - This finned BANGALORE Torpedo is launched from the Type 98 Discharger (Ed: same as that used to launch the Stick Grenade) and is used to destroy wire entanglements and light shelters.

"Construction and Functioning: - It consists of the body, fuse, accessories and box.

Length	Approx.	2 m (6.56 ft)
Weight	"	8.5 kg (18.74 lbs)

Body

Diameter	35mm (1.4 inches)
Thickness	2.6mm (0.1 inches)

Bursting Charge - Mk 2 TANOYAKU (TN According to documentary evidence: TNT, cyclonite and tetryl) about 2.25 kg (5 lbs)

Range:

Minimum	Approx.	90 m (295 ft)
Maximum	"	290 m (951 ft)

50% Zone

Length	Approx	9.5 m (31.2 ft)
Width	"	1.6 m (5.25 ft)

"The body consists of the A and B sections. A section is equipped with fins (consisting of three fins) and a range setting tool socket. The fins may be detached by unscrewing the bolts. B section is the same as that of Type 99 BANGALORE Torpedo.

"The fuse is instantaneous-short delay and has a safety plug and an arming vane. The safety mechanism has three safety features:

1. When the torpedo is to be launched, a safety mechanism is disengaged.
2. When it is fired, setback disengages a safety mechanism automatically.
3. The arming vanes rotate the safety plug due to the air pressure during flight, disengaging it. The fuse is then armed and is in a condition to fire upon impact.

"The fuse is set for instantaneous action to destroy wire entanglements and short delay to destroy light shelters.

"Because B section of the body of this BANGALORE Torpedo consists of several separate sections, it may be employed in the same manner as the Type 99 BANGALORE Torpedo.

"The box contains three BANGALORE Torpedoes together with three fuses."

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FINNED BANGALORE TORPEDO

Approximately
2050 (mm ?)
(79.9 in.)

Body Section A →

Body Section B (same as
that of Type 99
BANGALORE Torpedo) →

NOTE:- the outer
surface is painted
brown.

Fuse (Instantaneous-Short
Delay fuse with a safety
plug and an arming vane)

Bomber Mission Notes

(From XX Bomber Command Tactical Mission Reports
Nos 21, 22 and 23, flown 18th, 19th and 21st Dec 1944 ELT)

Following are brief extracts from these Mission Reports, included here for the possible future significance which the information may have.

Barrage Balloons:- One aircraft reported from 10 to 12 barrage balloons flying at an altitude of from 3,000 feet to 5,000 feet on the east bank of the YANGTZE River opposite the HANKOW Dock Area. The observation was made from 21,000 feet.

High-Altitude Balloons:- Seven high-altitude balloons were reported in the vicinity of HANKOW flying at approximately 19,000 feet. They were observed from an altitude of 18,000 feet and were from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile distant from the aircraft. The balloons were reported as having tail fins similar to the conventional barrage balloons and were silver in color but very small,

A possible high-altitude balloon was sighted by the crew in the vicinity of the southwestern tip of KOREA. "Only one balloon was seen which was tear-drop in shape and silver in color. The balloon was flying at an altitude of 22,000 feet."

One possible high-altitude balloon was observed over ANSHAN at an altitude of 22,000 feet. The balloon was described as round in shape, appearing as a silver dot in the sky, as the observation was made from a distance of approximately five miles.

An undetermined number of balloons was reported at TIENTSIN. "The balloons were raised just before the formation approached, but were lowered again as soon as it was seen that the planes were not on a bomb run." - or possibly at too high an altitude.

Two barrage balloons were observed approximately southwest of the target (MUKDEN) from an altitude of 22,500 ft. The balloons were reported at an altitude of approximately 10,000 ft.

Smokescreens:- MUKDEN. A black smokescreen, placed in operation before the first "bombs away" time, was observed by combat crew members and identified on strike photos. The damage assessment report states:-

"The smokescreen employed by the Jap was even more effective than that of the first attack due to an earlier warning and the construction of a number of new generating sites. Although a large part of the arsenal and all of the Aircraft Company were screened on the first effort, at no time were the airfield and runway entirely obscured. This time, however, the entire arsenal and Aircraft Factory as well as the airfield was effectively screened by the time the second wave of aircraft appeared. New construction of generating sites involved a number of new sites along the southern edge of the field as well as several north-south strings across the two plants.

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BOMBER MISSION NOTES (CONTD)

Reports by crew members indicate that at 0158 Z, the screen covered approximately two square miles including the target. This area had increased to partial concealment of the entire city by 0217 Z as a result of a 5 to 15 mph easterly wind. This smokescreen hampered Bombardiers, necessitating off-set bombing methods, and prevented visual observation of bomb strikes.

It also appears to have reduced the efficiency of the anti-aircraft opposition,

Jap Note on Bacteria

(From SE ASIA Translation Report No 72, 3 Jan 1945)

Captured in the KALEMYO Area 24 Nov 1944, was a copy of a circular entitled "Counter Measures against Bacteriological Warfare." Translation of the document, which is undated, reads as follows:

"To unit commanders and independent platoon commanders:

"Recently there have been sporadic local epidemics of dysentery, cholera and cattle-plague in the defense areas of TATSU and KIKU HEIDANS. Owing to the change in the war situation we can no longer discount the possibility of enemy schemes to use bacteria and poisons.

"Units will take steps to discover the cause of the present outbreaks and will see that strict anti-epidemic discipline is enforced. Henceforth special efforts will be made to obtain information concerning the enemy's plans for bacteriological warfare."

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Battlefield Propaganda

(From Hq XXIV Corps G-2 Summary No 7
23 Dec 44 to 10 Jan 45)

More than 50,000 leaflets, mainly of the surrender type, were employed by units of the Corps on LEYTE. Except for one instance of using artillery, distribution was made by cub plane drop and by patrols leaving leaflets on known routes of enemy groups. Initially, these leaflets were prepared by Sixth Army, but as the campaign progressed, it was found more efficacious to use leaflets prepared by the Division Language Sections in accordance with the prevailing tactical situation.

Due to terrain conditions, tank mounted public address systems were not used.

In one instance, a PW volunteered to return to the hills and attempt to persuade his fellows to cease resistance. His efforts resulted in nine more enemy giving themselves up.

The total PsW as of 11 January, captured by the XXIV Corps was 278, the majority of whom either surrendered with a leaflet or were directly influenced by our propaganda. The leaflets prepared by divisions in accordance with the tactical situation proved the most effective. In addition, many enemy dead were seen with leaflets; the enemy penalty for retaining a surrender leaflet is too severe to allow for any possibility that such leaflets were kept for souvenirs.

Conclusion: - Psychological warfare can be highly effective in the disruption and defeat of the enemy. Leaflets tuned to the strategical, tactical and logistical situation can first cause uneasiness and confusion in the mind of the Jap soldier; then create dissension between him and his officers who continue to drive him to a miserable death; and finally induce him to cease resistance.

Whenever possible, leaflets should be tested on PsW already captured. Generally they will give an honest reaction and invaluable insight into the oriental mind.

Direct personal appeal by PsW entrusted with such a mission must be carefully planned and handled. The unquestioned sincerity of the released PW must be ascertained. Care should be taken that the PW's knowledge of our dispositions be extremely limited so that he cannot divulge, willingly or otherwise, information which would be of benefit to the enemy.

Our own troops and natives must be thoroughly indoctrinated with the methods and purposes of psychological warfare. Our whole plan of attacking the enemy mentally can come to grief through one American soldier or guerrilla firing on a Jap coming forward with a leaflet. Care should be exercised that the enemy does not attempt a ruse, but all enemy desiring to surrender must be given every opportunity.

The following article is a result of studies and experiences with propaganda in the Aleutians, in Saipan and in the Leyte campaign. Numerous PsW, documents and diaries substantiate the effect of the theories which were used successfully by the 7th Division in the Leyte campaign.

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BAILEFIELD PROBABLY (CONTD)

It is necessary to go into a critique of the existing propaganda in order to contrast theories. The purpose of propaganda leaflets is to capture enemy military or civilian personnel to gain military information, to break enemy morale in order to cause dissension and disunity within the enemy lines, and to facilitate the mopping-up campaign by having the enemy come in to us rather than for us to go after them which is costly to us in both men and material.

For the above reasons all propaganda leaflets should be censored and coordinated by interpreters specialized in this line of work. In many cases, although the translated work may seem appropriate to Caucasian officers without a thorough knowledge of the Japanese language, the actual composition of the propaganda leaflets is juvenile or contrary to the Japanese psychology and language.

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BATTLEFIELD PROPAGANDA (CONT'D)

An ideal order of presentation in situation of appeal propaganda is as follows:

Address to the enemy officers and men, stressing our respect for their bravery to this date in the face of tremendous hardships.

Write about the situation confronting them in their immediate front and the situation as a whole. Stress the futility of further resistance and the desire of our forces to stop useless slaughter.

The purpose of living through the war is the most important item to stress. Dare them to live through this war to work for the reconstruction of Japan. Tell them that it is the most patriotic gesture to their Emperor and that death is but an escape. Clarify our treatment of PsW, to counteract their propaganda to their troops by telling them that if the Allied Nations win the war they will be shipped back to Japan and the defeat of Japan will deter their people from heaping disgrace upon them.

Sympathy and understanding of their situation must be written sincerely. An appeal should be made to the officers to pardon their men if they come out. The fact that we will provide them with good food, clothing and treatment for their wounds and sickness must be told. Good treatment should be stressed.

Conditions of surrender should be written tactfully. The word "Surrender" should be avoided if possible. The enemy should be persuaded to come out immediately because they are liable to wait too long. Stress should be made that the American soldiers may be devils in combat, but otherwise they are sportsmanlike in character.

The contents of the above propaganda must be condensed so as to be written on one sheet of paper. The choice of words and phrasing must not be offending, but forthright and sincere. Stress should be put on the purpose of living through the war rather than on food. Mention may be made of Japan and its beautiful cherry blossoms and culture that must be preserved. The appeal to the officers is made to cause dissension among the troops in case the officers do not agree. PsW state that units were coming down the hills to surrender, but unfortunately our artillery reached them first. Sometimes our troops mistake surrenderees for combatants and kill them. Enemy soldiers witnessing these actions will contend that our leaflets are just traps and use them as a ruse to attack our troops. Although the leaflets have been effective so far and we have captured the majority of our prisoners through this means, directly or indirectly, close coordination must be effected with the front line troops. The enemy is desperate at this period of the war, though in most instances in surrendering, he comes in with good intention.

In the composition of propaganda it is a good idea to have in mind the fact that the Japanese troops are forewarned of our propaganda and indoctrinated never to surrender. To break through this shell, our propaganda must be composed flawlessly so that their officers can find nothing to use against us and at the same time can see it is logical.

Tactical propaganda can be added to the situation propaganda. The purpose is to deviate their course of advance or attack. This can be done by tactfully mentioning the fact that we know of their intentions or that we are prepared for their attack. This will confuse them and at the same time provide enough time for us to take up necessary actions. When their communication system is secure it could not be used effectively, but when they are disorganized it will work.

Jap Battle Notes

(From ATIS Bulletin No 1695, 11 Jan 45)

I. Tactics Against the American Forces:

1. Assaults on MG Positions:

The curtain of fire which is due to the superior positions of the enemy MG's raises a terrific din which resounds in the jungle. There are cases in which we feel that the whole forward area is covered with MG positions, and our will to advance is checked.

However, when the fire and sound are well observed, one is able to judge the direction and distance, and it becomes possible to infiltrate with a small force and attack from the rear. It is absolutely necessary to keep digging in and crawling forward.

2. Launching Assault, and Scattering:

Since in the past it has happened often that assaults by the method of giving out a war cry from a considerable distance have been checked, due to jungle obstacles and enemy MG fire, it is necessary to make the assault and scatter at an extremely short distance (within 15 meters).

3. Need for Shelter Under Attack:

The greater number of our casualties in the recent fighting around TSURUBU, was not due to the storm of shells exploding on the ground but to their exploding when striking trees. If we exposed ourselves we invariably suffer losses. Therefore if we pause during an attack, it is necessary for every individual to protect his body with a light shelter. When it is difficult to obtain material for shelters, it is possible to dig trenches or holes.

4. Observation of Fire:

Unless we adhere to the essentials of observation in jungles, such as the utilization of trees by the observation squad in its advance, and the indication of targets by smoke shells, it is difficult to expect any results from our fire.

5. Special Training Needed by MG Units:

The essentials of transport in the jungle, and of rapid penetration of positions from dispersed order.

6. Command and Liaison in the Jungle:

If a dispersed order is adopted in the jungle, command liaison is almost impossible, and often misunderstandings occur. Especially is liaison with the flanks difficult. Since liaison by voice easily draws the enemy fire, it is possible to use something like a small whistle.

7. Ammunition Supply:

Unless consideration is given to methods of supplying ammunition, shortages will occur suddenly, and at an urgent moment a good opportunity may be missed.

JAP BATTLE NOTES (CONTD)

8. Handling water supply, cooking, sanitation, and evacuation of wounded under enemy fire are essentials in the conduct of battle.

II. Training in the Characteristics of American Forces:

1. The enemy is extremely fearful of our attacks and continues firing even at night. If subjected to our elusive penetration, they literally wail.

2. The enemy does not infiltrate our positions but limits himself to tossing hand grenades. However, if no posts are set up, he sometimes infiltrates at our rear.

3. Both night and day the enemy is noisy, and lacks any feeling for caution.

4. The enemy's ammunition supply is carried out by armored vehicles, consequently it can be judged that the enemy advance will be governed by the speed of road construction.

III. Impressions:

1. Type 96 LG (TN: Light Machine Gun.) has great power.

2. Type 92 MG (TN: Heavy Machine Gun.) has particularly great power in penetrating positions.

3. The automatic rifle is extremely advantageous in jungle fighting.

4. Tools for jungle use are absolutely necessary.

5. It is necessary to devise methods of carrying malaria prevention medicines (those in present use are often lost or damaged).

IV. Conclusion:

If we become skilled in the above tactics to be used against American forces, even though there are cases in which we lack the support of airplanes and artillery, we can be confident of our ability to penetrate American positions.

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Use of New Transport Submarine

(From GHQ, SWPA MIS No 1030, 20/21 Jan 45)

A new type of Jap submarine has been recovered by our Naval forces in LINGAYEN Gulf. Preliminary examination discloses the following specifications for these craft: Length: 130 ft; maximum diameter, 15 ft; capacity, 50 men; speed, 6-8 knots on surface, 2 knots submerged; single screw; armament, 1x5 pounder gun mounted aft of conning tower.

These subs, of which PWs state that only a small number are in commission, are used for transport purposes only and are operated by the Army--suggesting a further cleavage between the two branches of JAPAN's armed forces. Although only a few of these submarines seem to be currently available, and their armament is no threat to our shipping, they may very probably be employed by the enemy throughout the balance of the war for supplying isolated garrisons, evacuating key personnel, and landing small suicide raiding parties to attack our coastal installations.

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Sub-Based Airplanes

(SWPA ATIS Enemy Publications No 268, 19 Jan 1945)

About half of the large type cruiser submarines carry airplanes. They are used for searching out the enemy and for reconnoitering important places. Because these airplanes are of the small type their range is limited. Twenty to thirty minutes are required to assemble them.

Recently a Japanese submarine was pursued by a US destroyer in the Aleutian area. The submarine was forced to dive while the airplane was still assembled, causing great damage to the airplane. It is easy to catapult an airplane, but time is required to swing it up with a derrick after it has landed on the water. A calm sea is necessary.

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Jap Defense Against Airborne Attack

(From ATIS Bulletin No 1559, 14 Nov 1944)

Recovered from the Japs was a printed manual entitled "Reference on Combat Against Airborne Raider Units." It was issued in Oct 1943 by the Inspectorate General of Military Training. Its important portions, in gist, are presented here:

"Any enemy intention of landing airborne troops must be discovered beforehand through wide collection of information. His base must be attacked by our air forces, and any approaching hostile aircraft must be destroyed while airborne by our air forces and AA Units so that his intention is utterly defeated before any troop is landed on the ground.

"The key to success in combat against airborne raider units is to destroy the enemy before he assembles on the ground. The speedy collection of reliable information, thoroughness of security and preparedness of traffic and communication facilities are indispensable in crushing the intent of hostile airborne raider units.

"Airborne raider units are dispatched to airfields, vital traffic points, vital military installations, etc., to seize our air base or obstruct our troop concentration or deployment. When the general situation of the enemy operation is favorable to him, the airborne raider unit will maintain close contact with the enemy ground operation and harass our rear or participate in the decisive battle. Therefore, each CO must make accurate judgment as to the time and place of such enemy action to insure the success of our countermeasures.

"The enemy may also land a small number of men behind our lines to incite the inhabitants, or attack such vital military installations as factories, engineering works and signal stations. It is necessary, therefore, to be on the alert for enemy action such as destructions, fire and contamination, especially at night.

"Besides depending on reconnaissance by our air forces and on the anti-aircraft security system to counteract the hostile airborne raider units, intelligence (by indirect method) systems must be provided. Particularly, local associations must be instructed or patrols dispatched to vital points liable to become targets of hostile attacks so as to make clear the enemy situation and to maintain strict guard. Consideration must be given to the fact that the enemy usually attempts a landing at dawn or dusk. Security measures are also necessary to counteract enemy spies.

"Each CO is assigned a particular sector to combat the enemy airborne raider unit.

"The CO of the guarding unit must collaborate closely with other related forces, particularly with the air force, and mutually exchanging intelligence, must endeavor to discover promptly the plans of the enemy airborne raider unit. To expedite this, the higher CO's must establish the regulations relating to the collection of intelligence whenever necessary.

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JAP DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE ATTACK (CONTD)

"The CO of the guarding unit must construct positions at vital points apt to become the targets of the enemy airborne raider unit and dispose the necessary guard unit and AA unit to defend them.

"In many cases, the strength of the guard unit is small in comparison to the wide area to which it is assigned to defend. Even if its primary mission is not in combat because of this, it is necessary that it be trained to execute a decisive attack against the enemy before he has time to consolidate his armament. Its duties must not be limited to instructing the inhabitants, observing and reporting the situation; instead the guard unit must obstruct the enemy action immediately after his landing. It is important to remember that a small enemy force must be captured or annihilated as far as possible.

"In guarding an airfield, the air surrounding the airfield must be watched, airplanes and ground installations must be protected, ground defenses against enemy action to occupy the air sector must be thorough, and particularly night security and supervision of inhabitants coming in and out of the airfield must be strictly maintained.

"The disposition of the guard unit at the airfield differs according to the purpose of the airfield, strength of the guard unit, enemy situation, and terrain, but consideration must be given mainly to the protection of the airplanes and vital airfield installations.

"The guard unit should be situated at the most important point of the airfield from where the unit assigned to carry out AA firing is suitably posted. If necessary, a small unit is dispatched to vital areas and sentries (air guards) are posted. Patrols and visiting patrols are sent out at timely intervals.

"When in an area near a vital installation which is considered a possible objective of hostile airborne raids or near an area suitable for airplane landing and take-off, it is essential that full preparation be made to combat airborne raiders. This also applies to airfields which are not being used by our forces.

"In order to prevent the enemy airborne raiders from using an airfield or an area where landing and take-off is possible, obstacles must be set up or prepared in addition to posting a guard unit.

"In guarding railroads against hostile airborne raiders, it will be advantageous if a full-time force is assigned the duty.

"If information to the effect that an enemy airborne raider unit has departed from its base is received, this must be reported immediately to all guard units in the area concerned to insure the preparedness for the subsequent combat.

"Effort must be made to shoot down the airplanes within the effective range with AA guns, MG's, etc, before the parachute troops land on the ground.

"The parachute troops generally jump from the altitude of 1,000 meters (3,280 ft) and below. The average speed of fall is 5-6 meters (16-20 ft) per second. (If the jump is made from an altitude of 1,000 meters (3,280 ft) the time lapse up to landing is about 3 minutes.) Firing with AA, MG's and rifles against them is easy and its effect

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great. Hence as soon as the parachute troops jump, the AA unit as well as other units must keep cool and fire at them. After the hostile troops have landed on the ground, a speedy attack must be carried out, before the enemy consolidates his armament, to annihilate him.

"Items to bear in mind from the standpoint of combat:-

The enemy may land at several places around the perimeter of the airfield and attack from all directions; or may land at a distant point, consolidate his strength and then attack; or may land directly on the airfield and attack our weak points.

The enemy may employ a powerful Air Force to disrupt our flow of reinforcements to vital points by motor transports or other means of transportation.

During combat against airborne raiders, full use must be made of cover and individual security measures.

Because the combat material of the enemy is limited and his arms light, do not hesitate to carry out a resolute attack. The enemy supplies are dropped from the air, hence, considerations must be given to interfere with this.

The enemy may drop dummies to divert our attention elsewhere.

After accomplishing the mission, the enemy may withdraw from the area by airplanes. Therefore, these must be destroyed.

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(From WD MIS JOB Bul #97)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
<u>Army Hq</u>		
General Defense Hq		6,000
Kwantung Army		4,500
China Expeditionary Army		2,500
Southern Army		2,500
All others		500

Strengthened	1,2 Gds, 8,9,10,11, 12,19,23,24,25,28	23,500
Standard	1 Gds, 3 Gds, 3,4,5, 6,7,13,16,17,20,21, 22,26,27,30,32,34, 37,38,39,40,41,44, 46,47,48,49,50,51, 55,57,71,72,73,77, 81,84,86,93,104, 107,110,115,116 2 15 18,53,54,56 31,33	20,000 18,605 21,500 19,000 21,000
Regimental Combat Team	14,35,36,42,52,61	13,500
Brigaded	58,59,60,62,63,64, 65,68,69,70,100,102, 103,105,114,117 109 91 (although bri- gaded, strength of 20,000 is assigned because of abnormal number of battalions and supporting units)	13,000 11,500 20,000
Armored		11,000

T/O STRENGTHS (CONTD)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
<u>Ind Mixed Brigs</u>		
3 Bns (when size of bns unknown)		3,000
4 Bns (when size of bns unknown)		4,000
4 Bns	24-28, 34, 36, 37	4,650
5 Bns (when size of bns unknown)		6,000
5 Bns	29	5,581
5 Bns	1-3, 5, 7-9, 17, 19, 23	6,000
6 Bns (when size of bns unknown)		7,000
6 Bns	22	7,000
7 Bns	35	7,214
Misc	54, 55	3,000
	38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 58	4,000
	61	
	56, 57	6,000
	39	8,000
<u>Ind Inf Brigs</u>		
65th Brig, 68th Brig		5,000
Karafuto Brig		4,500
Cav Brigs		12,000
Amph Brigs		5,500
Ind Gars		5,416
Border Gars	2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9-13	3,500
	1, 4, 8	3,000
Gars (Chutontai) Aershan		8,000
Gars (Shubitai) 3rd Kuriles		5,000
South Seas Gar Units		5,000
Gar Comds		1,500
Def Comds		100
Hongkong Def Unit		150
South Seas Dets		5,000
Named Dets (Niijima, Hachijojima)		2,000
Gar Units (Keibitai)		1,000
Gar Bns		500
Sp Gar Bns		800
Sp Gar Cos		800
		150
<u>Fortresses</u>		
Eiko Bay, Hoyo, Iki		2,000
Maizuru, Rashin,		
Shimonoseki, Tokyo		
Bay, Yura		
Nagasaki, Port Arthur,		2,400
Reisui, Soya, Tsushima		
Amami Oshima		3,200
Funauki		2,800
Fusan		3,100
Keelung		2,600
Nakagusuku		3,000
Pescadores		2,200
Takao		3,600
Tsugaru		2,950

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Ind Mixed Regts	9	2,688
	11	2,688
	12	2,116
	13	1,627
	14, 21	3,000
	All others	4,000
Fld Repl Comds		100
Fld Repl Units		5,000
Fld Base Forces		100
Inf Regts	170	4,000
Ind Amph Bns		800
Inf Mortar Regts		1,850
Inf Mortar Bns		825
Medium Mortar Bns		600
Army Arty Units (Hq only)		200
Named Hv Arty Regts		1,400
Ind Fld Arty Regts		575
Ind Fld Arty Bns		525
Ind Mt Arty Regts		2,750
Ind Mt Arty Bns		925
Ind Medium Arty Bns		700
Ind Medium Arty Regts		1,500
Ind Hv Arty Bns (B)	5, 7, 8	625
Ind Hv Arty Bns (C)	All others	600
Ind Hv Arty Bn (D)	4	900
Ind Hv Arty Bns (E)		625
Ind Hv Arty Cos		300
Ind Arty Mortar Regts		1,850
Ind Arty Mortar Bns		900
Arty Comds		125
Medium Arty Regts (A)	1, 3, 4, 17, 20	1,800
Medium Arty Regts (A)	2, 5, 6, 9-14	2,325
Medium Arty Regt (A)	15	1,500
Medium Arty Regts (B)	All others?	1,100
Medium Arty Bns		700
Hv Arty Regts (A)		1,225
Shipping Arty Regts		2,300
Arty Intelligence Regts		675
Bln Regts		800
Bln Cos		200
AA Def Gps		200
AA Def Brigs		150
Named AA Def Intelligence Units		100
Ind AA Def Bns		500
Ind AA Arty Bns		350
Ind AA Arty Cos		125
Ind Fld AAA Cos		175
Ind Fld Searchlight Cos		185
Rangoon AA Def Comd		100
AA Def Regts		1,100
AAA Regts		1,100
AA Def Sig Units		100
AA Def Obsn Units		175
AA Def Bln Units (A)		350
AA Def Bln Units (B)		100
Fld AA Def Units		75
Fld AAA Bns (A)		675
Fld AAA Bns (B)		525

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T/O STRENGTHS (CONTD)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Machine Cn Bns		350
Fld Machine Cn Cos	15,17-20,22-24	250
Fld Machine Cn Cos	16,21,25-27	125
Searchlight Regts		1,000
Searchlight Bns		450
AA Radio Units		125
Ind Antitank Bns		475
Ind Antitank Cos		150
Tank Regts (Except 4th)		650
4th Tank Regt		450
Ind Tank Cos		150
Ind Tankette Cos		130
Ind Engr Regts	Type (A) (B) - 9	900
(Since types of specific	Type (D)	1,050
regts in all other	Type (E)	1,700
cases unknown, will	Type (F)	800
continue to be carried	Type (I)	975
at T/O of 1,000)		
Ind Engr Bns		600
Ind Engr Cos		175
Engr Units (Comd)		50
Sp Gar Engr Units		200
Shipping Engr Regts		1,200
1st Shipping Engr Fld		5,000
Repl Units		
Mobile Regts		3,000
Fld Cons Units (Comd)		50
Fld Road Cons Units		400
Fld Duty Units		325
Bridge Building Material Cos		425
Bridge Building Material Cos		700
Cons Duty Cos		200
Sp Cons Duty Cos		25 Japs
Fld Well Drilling Cos		185
River Crossing Material Cos		225
Survey Units		175
Development Units		1,400
Army Sig Units		100
Ind Sig Cos		425
Ind Wire Cos	61,67,68,69,72,74,	450
	76,78,80,81	
	62,63,64,65,66,70	425
	71,73,75,77,79,82,	
	83,84,85	
Sig Regts		2,400
Shipping Sig Regts		635
Fixed Shipping Sig Regts		635
Sig Units		300
Fixed Sig Units		300
Fixed Radio Units		25
Ind Radio Cos		125
Shipping Fixed Radio Unit		500
Fld Sig Cos		200
Sp Radio Location Units		290
Sp Radio Units		300
Ind Transport Regts		3,000
Ind Transport Bns (A)		2,500
Ind Transport Bns (A)	75	2,725
Ind Transport Bns (B)		1,025

T/O STRENGTH (CONTD)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Ind Transport Cos		400
Ind Transport Cos		450
Ind Motor Transport Bns		800
Ind Motor Transport Cos		175
Sp Motor Transport Cos		50 Japs
Fld Transport Comds		50
Fld Motor Transport Depots (A)		1,675
(Includes Mobile Repair		
Sec of 200 and Duty		
Co of 475)		
Fld Motor Transport Depot (B)		425
(Includes Duty Plat of 120)		
Motor Transport Depot,		500
Kwantung Army		
Motor Transport Regts		1,500
Sp Motor Transport Regts		1,500
L/C Motor Transport Units		400
L/C Motor Transport Cos		175
Casualty Clearing Units		120
Casualty Clearing Plats		60
Shipping Medical Unit		750
L/C Hosps		350
L/C Medical Units		125
(Including Mobile Treatment		
Sec of 85)		
L/C Vet Hosps		525
Vet Quarantine Hosps (A)		150
Vet Quarantine Hosps (B)		125
Fld Water Supply and		325
Purif Depts (B)		
Fld Ry Comds		475
Burma Ry Unit		150
Sp Ry Comds		50
Ry Transport Comds		75
Ry Regts		2,500
Sp Ry Transportation Unit		50
Sp Ry Engr Sv Unit (KOMUTAI)		50
Sp Ry Bridge Unit		50
Sp Ry Cons Unit (KOSAKUTAI)		50
Sp Ry Work Unit (YODOTAI)		50
Ry Inspectorate		75
Ry Supply Depot		175
Ry Stas		25
Armd Train Units		500
Ind Ry Bridging Bns		600
Ind Ry Cons Units		300
Ind Ry Engr Sv Bn		600
Airborne (TEISHIN) Regts		750
Commando (YUGEKI) Units		50(Hq only)
Commando Cos		200
Gas Bns		525
Fld Gas Cos		220
Ind Gas Cos		425
Fld Freight Depots (A)		1,350
(Includes Clothing Mobile		
Repair Sec of 120, Medical		
Stores Mobile Repair Sec		
of 40, Vet Stores Mobile		
Repair Sec of 40, and Duty		
Co of 700)		

T/O STRENGTH (CONTD)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Fld Freight Depots (B)		300
(Includes Duty Plat of 175)		
Fld Freight Depot,		200
Kwantung Army		
Fld Ord Depots (A)		1,500
(Including Mobile Repair		
Sec of 125 and Duty Co		
of 470)		
Fld Ord Depot (B)		375
(Including Duty Plat of 120)		
Fld Shipping Ord Depot		175
Remount Depots		100
Fuel Depot		800
Fld MP Units		400
L/C Sector Units		1,750
Fuel Engr Depot		800
Tractor Units		175
Tractor Cos		100
Tractor Maint Units		150
Shipping Forces		200
Shipping Gps		100
Shipping Transport Comds		175
Shipping Transport Sector Units		100
Sea Transport Bns		850
Rapid Transport Bn		800
Mobile Transport Cos		200
Main Fld Shipping Depots		1,000
Ind Sea Transport Cos		150
Sea Destroyer Bns		800
Mobile Transport Units		1,000
Debarkation Units		1,000
Anchorage (Hq)		60
Sea Duty Cos		350
Sp Sea Duty Cos		25 Japs
Land Duty Cos		350
Sp Land Duty Cos		25 Japs
Sea Transport Obsn Units		300
Shipping Repair Depots		150
Water Transport Units		1,500
Sp Water Transport Units		25
Launching Units		150
Army (Mil) Hosps		300
Fld Postal Unit		250
Fld Fortification Unit		375

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Japanese AAF Code Designations

(From SWPA Intelligence Summary No 251, 23 Dec 44)

The following is a translation of a document, captured on LEXTE, PHILIPPINE Islands on 11 Nov 44. The column of "Allied Code" designations has been inserted for convenience.

Army Airplane Designation Chart (KI) Airplanes Up To Present Time

Designation	Allied Code	Manufacturer	Name	Type	Engine
KI 1		MITSUBISHI	Type 93 II Heavy Bomber		HA 2
KI 2		"	Type 93 Two-engined Light Bomber		JU Type
KI 2 A		"	Same (II)		HA 8
KI 3		KAWASAKI	Type 93 Single Engine Light		HA 7
KI 4		NAKAJIMA	Type 94 Recon Plane		HA 8
KI 5				Low wing, single seat, fighter	
KI 6		NAKAJIMA	Type 95 M 2 Training Plane	Imp SUPER-UNIVERSAL	JU Type II
KI 7					
KI 8				Low wing, two seat, monoplane	
KI 9		TACHIKAWA	Type 95 M 1 Training Plane		HA 13
KI 10		KAWASAKI	Type 95 Fighter		HA 9 II
KI 14		MITSUBISHI		Land fighter	
KI 15 II		"	Type 97 Hq Recon Plane		HA 8 II
KI 15 II		"	Same (M II)		HA 26 I
KI 17		TACHIKAWA	Type 94 M 3 Training Plane		HA 12
KI 19				Heavy Bomber	
KI 20		MITSUBISHI	Type 92 Heavy Bomber		Type 2 800 hp
KI 21	SALLY 1	"	Type 97 Heavy Bomber		HA 5
KI 21 II		"	Same (M 2)		HA 101
KI 23		"		Land Fighter	
KI 25				Single seat Glider	
KI 27	NATE 1	NAKAJIMA	Type 97 Fighter		HA 12
KI 28		KAWASAKI		Single seat, fighter, monoplane	
KI 30		MITSUBISHI	Type 97 light Bomber		HA 5

JAPANESE IAF CODE DESIGNATIONS (CONTD)

Designation	Allied Code	Manufacturer	Name	Type	Engine
KI 32	MARY 1	KAWASAKI	Type 98 Light Bomber		HA 9 II A
KI 33		MITSUBISHI		Single seat, fighter, monoplane	
KI 34		NAKAJIMA	Type 97 Transport Plane	AT M II	HA 2
KI 35		MITSUBISHI		Direct co-operation rcn biplane	
KI 36		TACHIKAWA	Type 98 Direct Co-operation rcn Plane		HA 13 A
KI 37		NAKAJIMA		Single engine, two seat ftr	
KI 38				Two engine, two seat, ftr	
KI 39				Same as above	
KI 40		MITSUBISHI		Hq rcn plane	
KI 41		NAKAJIMA		Transport plane	
KI 42				Super heavy bomber	
KI 43	OSCAR 1	NAKAJIMA	Type 1 Ftr		HA 25
KI 43 II	OSCAR 2	"	Same (M II)		HA 115
KI 45	NICK 1	KAWASAKI	Type 2 Two Seat Ftr		HA 102
KI 44	TOJO 1 or 2	NAKAJIMA	Type 2 Ftr and M II		HA 41 M II- HA 109
KI 46	DINAH 1	MITSUBISHI	Type 100 Hq Rcن Plane		HA 26 I
KI 46 II		"	Same (M 2)		HA 102
KI 47				Single engine light bomber	
KI 48	LILY 1	KAWASAKI	Type 99 Two Engine Light Bomber		HA 25
KI 48 II	LILY 2	"	Same (M 2)		HA 115
KI 49	HELEN 1	NAKAJIMA	Type 100 Heavy Bomber		HA 41
KI 49 II	HELEN 2	"	Same (M 2)		HA 109
KI 49 III	HELEN 3	"	Same (M 3)		HA 117
KI 50				Super heavy bomber	
KI 51	SONIA 1	MITSUBISHI	Type 99 Army Rcن Assault Plane	Exp 11	HA 26 II
KI 52				Attack plane (Special imp bomber)	
KI 53				Multi seat ftr	
KI 54		TACHIKAWA	Type 1 Two Engine Advanced Training Plane		HA 13 A
KI 55			Type 99 Advanced Training Plane		HA 13 A
KI 56	THELMA	KAWASAKI	Type 1 Cargo Transport Plane	Domestic LOCKHEED	HA 25

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JAPANESE A.I.F. CODE DESIGNATIONS (CONTD)

Designation	Allied Code	Manufacturer	Name	Type	Engine
KI 57	TOPSY 1	MITSUBI-SHI	Type 100 Transport Plane	(Commonly known as NC 20)	HA 5
KI 57 II	SALLY 3) TOPSY 3)	MITSUBI-SHI	Same (M II)		HA 102
KI 58		NAKAJIMA		Multi seat ftr (A)	
KI 59	THERESA 1	KOKUSAI	Type 1 Transport Plane	Department of Communication TK M II (Imp)	HA 13 A
KI 60		KAWASAKI		Single seat, heavy ftr	DB 601 (TN: MERCEDES BENZ DB 601)
KI 61	TONY 1	"	Type 3 Ftr		HA 40
KI 61 II		"		Single seat light ftr	HA 140
KI 62		NAKAJIMA		Same as above	
KI 63		NAKAJIMA		Single seat, heavy ftr	
KI 64	ROB 1	KAWASAKI		Same as above	
KI 65		MITSUBISHI		Heavy ftr	
KI 66		KAWASAKI		Light bomber (dive bomber)	HA 115 X 2
KI 67		MITSUBISHI		Heavy bomber	HA 104 X 2
KI 66 II		KAWASAKI		Light bomber (dive bomber)	HA 315 X 2
KI 68		NAKAJIMA		Long range bomber (Navy Exp 12, OSAKA Imp)	
KI 69		MITSUBISHI		Bomber, cover (ENGO) plane	Two Engines
KI 70	CLARA 1	TACHIKAWA		Hq rcn plane	HA 104 X2
KI 71	EDNA 1	Air depot (KOSHO)		Army rcn plane	HA 112
KI 72		TACHIKAWA		Direct co-operation rcn plane	HA 38
KI 73	STEVE 1	MITSUBISHI		Experimental, super high speed plane	HA 203 X 2
KI 74	PAT 1	TACHIKAWA		Long range bomber (rcn)	HA 214 X2
KI 75		NAKAJIMA		Long range, two seat ftr	HA 114 X2
KI 76		KOKUSAI	Type 2 Liaison Plane		HA 42
KI 77		TACHIKAWA		Experimental, super range plane	HA 105 (Imp) (Commonly known as A 26)
KI 78		KAWASAKI		Experimental, super range plane	HA 140

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JAPANESE AAF CODE DESIGNATIONS (CONTD)

Designation	Allied Code	Manufacturer	Name	Type	Engine
KI 79		Air depot	Type 2 advanced training plane	Imp KI 27	HA 13 A
KI 80		NAKAJIMA		Heavy bomber, mixed air brig CO plane (KONHI-DAN)	Imp KI 49 HA 109 X 2
KI 81		KAWASAKI		Light bomber, air regt CO plane (SENTAI)	Imp KI 49 HA 115 X 2
KI 82		NAKAJIMA		High speed bomber	HA 45 X 2
KI 83		MITSUBISHI		Long range, two engine, ftr	HA 211 X 2
KI 84	FRANK 1	NAKAJIMA		Single seat, heavy fighter	1 HA 45 II HA 145
KI 85		KAWASAKI		Long range bomber (Exp 14 OSAKA 4 Imp)	HA 12 X 4
KI 86		KOKUSAI		JUNGEN type, domestic manufactured, training plane	HA 47
KI 87		NAKAJIMA		Short range, heavy ftr	HA 245
KI 88		KAWASAKI		Long range ftr. KI 61 II with heavier armament	HA 140 X
KI 89		KAWASAKI		Single engine, light bomber	HA 140
KI 90		MITSUBISHI		Short range bomber	
KI 91		KAWASAKI		Long range bomber	
KI 92		TACHIKAWA		Medium transport	HA 104
KI 93		Air depot		Exp heavy cannon mounted plane	HA 214 X 2
KI 94		NAKAJIMA		High altitude, single seat, ftr	
KI 95		MITSUBISHI		Imp KI 83, Hq rcn plane	
KI 97		MITSUBISHI		Imp KI 67 transport plane	HA 104

Order of Battle

Including discussion on sources of information and methods of identifying units, the following is based on a lecture on Jap Order of Battle given by an officer of G-2, Hq, USAFPOA.

DEFINITION

1. Order of Battle is the strength and disposition of Armed Forces.
2. J.O.B. is the abbreviation for Japanese Order of Battle.

SCOPE

1. The JOB section is concerned primarily with the identification, location and strength of Japanese Army and Navy ground and air units.
2. JOB is also concerned with the history and movement of air and ground units of the Japanese Army and Navy.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1. Contact in combat.

Reports of contact in combat are accepted as definite indentifications. Enemy troops are identified from dog-tags, insignia on uniforms and various symbols on material.

2. Captured Documents

These include official documents, such as operations orders, mobilization plans, transportation schedules, transfer lists, debarkation orders, etc; savings books; personal diaries and note books; post cards and letters; and scraps of paper. Information obtained from official documents is without doubt the most important and conclusive, and can be relied upon as factual almost without exception.

Diaries and note books, although personal, give valuable information regarding the mobilization and movement of units as well as important confirmatory evidence of reorganization or dissolution of units.

Post cards and letters supply reliable information in that they are usually dated and enable us to locate units at a given date in a specific spot.

Savings books also supply valuable information used to trace movements of units.

Every scrap of paper regardless of how unimposing should be regarded as a possible source of information and should be retained for inspection and translation.

3. Agents' Reports

Guerrillas and friendly elements in combat zones can be of immeasurable help if they are observant and able to describe accurately what they have seen or heard. A single report from Agent sources is not ordinarily considered sufficient for a definite conclusion, but a series of such reports from several unassociated agents in the same area afford valuable data on trends, troop concentrations, troop movements, reinforcements, etc.

4. Radio Intercepts

This source of information is a highly specialized one and furnishes very valuable intelligence. The details of operation are classified to a degree that denies discussion by any but those concerned.

5. Interrogation of Prisoners of War

Prisoner of War interrogations are becoming increasingly important in the gathering of information concerning our enemies. Through prisoners we are able to establish strengths of units, locations, movements, organization, history, home and overseas codes, equipment, code names and commanders' names, as well as terminology and symbols.

A well conducted interrogation confirms much of the knowledge already in our possession and adds new and relative information.

A series of interrogations of members of the same unit increases the value of the information, since it is then compared and analyzed for evaluation.

6. Interrogation of Civilians

The information to be obtained from civilians of a nation engaged in combat with a common enemy offers vast possibilities.

This is especially true in regard to political, industrial and economic conditions.

It can also be of significant importance in gaining information concerning Order of Battle. How much of value can be obtained will depend almost entirely on those doing the interrogating. The interrogators equipped with a working knowledge of Japanese Order of Battle information as well as a thorough knowledge of the types of organizations in the Japanese Military Service and the ways and means of identifying and locating them, will be able to accomplish much.

FACTORS EMPLOYED TO IDENTIFY UNITS

1. Home Code Numbers
2. Divisional Districts
3. Code Names
4. Overseas Code Numbers
5. Names of Unit Commanders
6. Actual numerical designation of units.
7. Chinese Telegraph Codes.

In other words, a Division may be referred to in several ways to establish identification. For instance, the 1st Division may be encountered as the TAMA Division, the KATAOKA Division, TOKYO Division, 5910 Butai (or unit), TAMA 5910 Butai, 1st Division, JHU, or TOBU.

TAMA is the code name for the 1st Div.

KATAOKA is the commander of the 1st Div.

TOKYO is the Divisional District in which it was raised.

5910 is the overseas code number of the 1st Div.

TAMA 5910 is the combination of Code name & number.

1st Division is the actual numerical designation.

JHU is the Chinese Telegraph Code for the Japanese character that means TAMA

TOBU is the Home Code name representing the Army Administrative District which has administrative jurisdiction over the 1st Div.

HOME CODE NUMBERS

1. Zoning of Japan into Army Administrative Districts

Japan proper is divided into 4 Army Administrative Districts: Eastern, Western, Central and Northern.

2. Dividing of Army Administrative Districts into Divisional Districts.

Each Army Administrative District is divided into a number of Divisional districts which are the permanent home stations of the regular divisions which constitute the Japanese standing army.

In war however, when a regular division goes overseas, it leaves behind a Depot Division whose function is to equip, train and supply personnel to its active division in the field and to any other reserve divisions which may have been formed in the same divisional district.

A Depot Division fulfills another function in that it may provide the nucleus for forming additional reserve divisions.

A Divisional District therefore may be occupied by a regular Division (for example the 6th Div), or a Depot Division (for example the 6th Depot Div), or a reserve division (for example the 46th Div).

The Division actually occupying the Divisional district, regardless of type, undertakes the functions of a Depot Division.

3. Subdividing Divisional Districts into Regimental Districts.

Divisional Districts are subdivided into Regimental Districts which are virtually conscription districts. Usually they include one prefecture each.

a. Allocation of Numbers to Regimental Districts

In 1941 a system of Code Numbers was introduced whereby each Regimental Headquarters was allotted a number. This number is referred to as the "Home Code Number". It is preceded by the name of the Army Administrative District to which it is subordinate, i.e., Tobu, Seibu, Hokubu, Chubu, meaning Eastern, Western, Northern, Central.

4. Korean and Formosan Army Administrative Districts

The Korean Army Administrative District is divided into 2 Divisional Districts.

The Formosan Army Administrative District comprises 1 Divisional District.

a. Similar to those in Japan, the Divisional Districts are subdivided into Regimental Districts which are given numbers representing Home Code designations.

5. Abbreviations for Japanese Words for Army Administrative Districts

TOBU	-	Eastern	-	E
CHUBU	-	Central	-	C
SEIBU	-	Western	-	W
HOKUBU	-	Northern	-	N
CHOSEN	-	Korea	-	K
TAIWAN	-	Formosa	-	F

[REDACTED]

These are the words found preceding the Home Code Numbers allocated to Regimental Districts. The letter designators are our own adaptations for simplification.

6. Known Regimental Districts

a. Home Code Numbers for Regimental Districts controlled by Divisional Districts under the Eastern Army Administrative District have been encountered from 1 to as high as 129, although the entire sequence from 1 to 129 has not been identified or located.

Likewise, Home Code Numbers for Central Army Administrative District have been identified from 1 to 178.

Numbers from 1 to 178 have also been identified for the Regimental Districts in the Western Army Administrative District.

For the Northern District, numbers have been identified from 1 to 200.

Korean or Chosen District numbers identified to date extend from 1 to 175.

For Taiwan or Formosa, the numbers identified so far go as high as 108.

b. Names of Regimental Districts

Every Regimental District represented by a Home Code Number is also named. The Regimental District takes the name of the city in which the Regimental District Headquarters is situated. These names are usually used in conjunction with the Home Code number in documents and are more often than not remembered by prisoners of war since these headquarters represent the locations where they were conscripted.

7. Method of identifying units from Home Code Numbers.

Every unit has a home code number. However, the same home code number will be found for several units since each Regimental District raises a number of units and continues to equip and supply replacements for all the units it raises.

As many as 26 units have been found with identical home code numbers. These units may be divisional components, separate units or independent units and may vary widely in type and organization.

This difference in the type of unit that may be supplied by a Regimental District aids in the identifying of units from Home Code numbers.

For example, W-4 raised and supplied replacements for the following units:

- 42d Inf Regt, 5th Division
- 233d Inf Regt, 39th Div
- 54th Ind Inf Bn, 64th Div
- 124th Ind Inf Bn, 70th Div
- 105th Ind Inf Bn, 70th Div
- 122d Ind Inf Bn, 70th Div
- 181st Ind Inf Bn, 105th Div
- 182d Ind Inf Bn, 105th Div
- 183d Ind Inf Bn, 105th Div

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An unidentified unit with the Home Code No. W-4 is discovered at Tangyang, in Hupeh Province. Our records show that the 5th Division with all its infantry components are located in the SWPA, so the 42d Inf Regt of the 5th Div is eliminated. Likewise, we know the location of the 64th, 70th and 105th Divisions and that they are present in the known locations with all their ancillary units.

Thus by analysis of available information and the process of elimination we arrive at the conclusion that the unit at Tangyang with the Home Code No. W-4 is the 233d Inf Regt of the 39th Div.

In some cases it will be found that the Home Code Number designates a Regimental District that supplies replacements for several types of units such as Inf Regts, Ind Inf Bns, Ind Garrison Inf Bns, Amphibious Bdes, Land Duty Cos, etc.

If our information indicates that the unit is an Amphibious Unit, all others can be eliminated as possibilities and the field is narrowed to the Amphibious Units. By locating one or more of the Amphibious Units, the possibilities are further reduced until only one or two units remain as logical.

It is always possible that a new unit heretofore unidentified is the unit in question. This possibility is noted and filed pending further information and confirming evidence.

DIVISIONAL DISTRICTS

As mentioned previously, Japan is divided for administrative purposes and conscription into 4 Army Administrative Districts. These in turn are divided into Divisional Districts. Korea and Formosa are similarly zoned for the same purpose. Following is a chart of the Divisional Districts, which are named instead of numbered, the Army Administrative Districts to which the Divisional Districts are subordinate and the number of divisions each Divisional District equips, trains and reinforces.

1.	TOKYO.....	EAAD.....	9 Divisions
	SENDAI.....	EAAD.....	5 Divisions
	UTSUNOMIYA.....	EAAD.....	6 Divisions
	KANAZAWA.....	EAAD.....	3 Divisions
2.	HIROSHIMA.....	WAAD.....	3 Divisions
	KUMAMOTO.....	WAAD.....	3 Divisions
	ZENTSUJI.....	WAAD.....	3 Divisions
	KURUME.....	WAAD.....	2 Divisions
3.	NAGOYA.....	CAAD.....	5 Divisions
	OSAKA.....	CAAD.....	4 Divisions
	KYOTO.....	CAAD.....	5 Divisions
	HIMEJI.....	CAAD.....	4 Divisions
4.	ASAHIKAWA.....	NAAD.....	2 Divisions
	HIROSAKI.....	NAAD.....	5 Divisions
5.	RANAN.....	KOREA.....	1 Division
	KEIJO.....	KOREA.....	2 Divisions
6.	FORMOSA.....	TAIWAN.....	2 Divisions

Each Divisional District may also be responsible for parts of other Divisions.

7. Method of identifying Divisions from Divisional District names.

Here again, the process of elimination is used when a unit is located in a given area and referred to only by the name of the Divisional District, i.e., Kurume, Tokyo, etc.

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By referring to our records, we can locate all Divisions from the Divisional District in question. The division indicated in the given location will probably be the unit reported. If none of the Divisions from the particular District is in the vicinity, it can be assumed that one of them has moved or that another Division as yet unidentified has been raised by the named Divisional District.

CODE NAMES

1. Nearly 300 different code names have been identified to date. Many of these have Japanese characters that can be translated in two ways, so an alphabetical cross index is maintained to show both translations.
- 2.. Code names are given only to major units; namely, Armies, Divisions, Ind Mixed Bdes, Ind Inf Bdes, Amphibious Bdes, Bdes other than Mixed or Ind Inf, Cavalry Bdes and Air Armies and Divisions. All Army Shipping Units have the Code name Akatsuki.
3. These Code names seldom if ever change. Only one instance has been brought to light wherein the code name of a major unit changed. This change was uncovered by official captured documents. For this reason, the possibility of future changes must not be overlooked.
4. Components of major units are given the same code name as the parent unit. For instance, the Inf Regiments of the 43d Division are indicated in official orders with the code name Homare which is the 43d Division code name. Likewise the Artillery, Engineer, Signal, Transportation and other units of the Division all have the same code name.
5. Separate units use the code names of the units to which they are attached or subordinate. For this reason, we may encounter the same unit with several code names. However, it will be found that this merely represents a change or transfer of the unit to another command and the code name used at the most recent date is the code name of the formation which now has jurisdiction over the separate or independent unit.
6. It is important therefore to know the date of the information; at least the month and year the information was valid. For example: Go 1945 was identified in June 1944 as the 34th Fd Machine Cannon Co. In August 1944, the code number 1945 was found with the Code name Mo. In October 1944, it appeared with the code name Moto. "Go" is the code name for the 8th Area Army with Headquarters at Rabaul, New Britain, so the 34th Fd Machine Cannon Co was apparently under the direct command of that Army in June 1944 and in the area under its jurisdiction.

"Mo" is the code name for the 18th Army in New Guinea, so it is deduced that the 34th Fd Machine Cannon Co was transferred from the 8th Area Army to the command of the 18th Army sometime between June 1944 and August 1944.

"Moto" is the code name for the 51st Division in New Guinea. When the number 1945 appeared with the code name "Moto", it indicated that the unit became subordinate to the 51st Division and had been transferred from the 18th Army to the 51st Division sometime between August and October 1944.

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If a Butai (Unit) is identified merely by code number, which often happens, it may mean little other than that the unit exists. If it is preceded by a code name, it can have significance in that the unit will at least be associated with an existing major unit. The code name, if previously identified, will definitely locate the unit in a general area since the jurisdictional boundaries of major formations have been established fairly accurately. As in the case of Butai 1945, which appeared successively with the code names "Go", "Mo", and "Moto", the movement of the unit from New Britain to New Guinea and then to the particular area under the 51st Division was established. If 1945 appeared again in June 1945 associated with the code name Sonae, it would re-locate the 34th Fd Machine Cannon Co in the Central Pacific Area, under the 31st Army.

Code names, therefore, are important in locating identified units with known code numbers, especially if the information is dated.

CODE NUMBERS (OVERSEAS)

1. Purpose of Code Numbers

The scheme of assigning code numbers to units going overseas or leaving the Japanese Empire was devised mainly for security. Unit numbers are used extensively and until identified present a difficult problem in estimating strengths in various theaters.

Very often code numbers are located in areas long before they are definitely associated with the units to which assigned. However, much progress has been made in the identifying of code numbers and applying them to units they represent.

2. Code numbers from 1 to 20,000 have been identified. That is, numbers ranging from 1 to 20,000 have been encountered and are known to exist as representing units in the Japanese Army, but the units they represent are still to a large degree undisclosed.

In contrast, many units have been identified for which the code numbers are unknown.

3. Allocation of Code Numbers.

Study of code numbers and their association with units and areas has revealed certain definite patterns for assignment.

a. To Manchurian Units.

It has now become apparent that the block of numbers from 1 to 1000 was initially assigned to units stationed in Manchuria. Except for the fact that a block of 1000 numbers was assigned to Manchurian units, no sequence pattern exists for units under the Kwantung Army (the major formation in Manchuria).

It has also been established that numbers over 1000 have been arbitrarily assigned to Manchurian units, due probably to expansion of the Army and the rapid increase in the number of units.

A significant fact concerning Manchurian units is that when units move to other theaters, new code numbers of 4 or 5 digits are assigned, if the original number is under 1000. If the original number is over 1000 it remains when the unit moves. Until departure from Manchuria all Manchuria-stationed units are designated as Manchu or Mansho, with a number usually under 1000.

Manchu is not a code name but is used as such as a common name for all units stationed in Manchuria.

b. To Major Units

Identifications to date indicate that numbers in the 1400 & 1800 series were assigned to the North China Area Army in blocks. It also appears likely that the 1600 series was assigned to Central China although evidence is not conclusive.

Ordinarily blocks of 20 numbers are assigned to Divisions. The sequence is usually followed without a break for triangular divisions but brigaded divisions are assigned two blocks of ten numbers often widely separated. This departure from normal results from the fact that brigaded divisions are formed from one or two Ind Mixed Brigades, the components of which retain their code numbers when expanded or combined to form divisions.

The outstanding exception to the pattern for brigaded divisions is the 109th Division which has a block of 24 consecutive numbers assigned to it.

Ind Mixed Bdes are usually allotted blocks of 10 consecutive numbers.

Ind Infantry Bdes are found with blocks of 6 consecutive numbers.

Cavalry Bdes are assigned blocks of 6 consecutive numbers.

Amphibious Bdes identified to date have blocks of 10 consecutive numbers.

Independent Mixed Regiments have only 1 code number.

4. Code numbers do not change.

Only one specific instance has been brought to light wherein a code number was changed. The reason for the change has not been discovered as yet.

As stated previously, units stationed in Manchuria with code numbers below 1000 are given new numbers upon leaving. However, the Manchurian number is not reassigned to another unit and remains as an identifying number for the same unit. In other words, units formerly stationed in Manchuria may be identified by 2 different code numbers, the overseas code number and the Manchurian number.

5. Interpolation of Code Numbers for major units.

a. Tentatively assigning code numbers for components of divisions and major formations of similar type may be done fairly and accurately by interpolation.

Given a single identified code number of a division and working the sequence both ways, the majority of the components can be assigned numbers corresponding in sequence to those of a similar type division whose numbers are known.

9015 - 6 Div	9202 - Probably 7 Div
9016 - 6 Div	9203 - " 7 "
9017 - 6 Div Inf	9204 - " 7 " Inf
9018 - 13 Inf Regt	9205 - " 26 Inf Regt
9019 - 23 Inf Regt	9206 - " 27 " "
9020 - 45 Inf Regt	9207 - known to be 28 Inf Regt, 7th Div
9021 - (blank)	9208 - Probably blank
9022 - 6 Cav Regt	9209 - " 7 Div Cav Inf Ren Regt
9023 - (blank)	9210 - " blank
9024 - 6 FA Regt	9211 - " 7 Mtn Arty Regt

9025 - 6 Engr Regt	9212 - "	7 Engr Regt
9026 - 6 D Sig Unit	9213 - "	7 Div Sig Unit
9027 - 6 Tpt Regt	9214 - "	7 " Tpt Unit
9028 - 6 D Ord Unit	9215 - "	7 " Ord Unit
9029 - 6 D Med Unit	9216 - "	7 " Med Unit
9030 - 1 Fd Hosp	9217 - "	1 Fd Hosp
9031 - 2 Fd Hosp	9218 - "	2 Fd Hosp
9032 - 3 Fd Hosp	9219 - Probably	3 Fd Hosp
9033 - 4 Fd Hosp	9220 - "	Fd Hosp
9034 - 6 D WS&P Dept	9221 - "	7 Div WS&P Dept
9035 - 6 D Vet Hosp	9222 - "	7 " Vet Hosp

This method can be applied to other major units of similar organization. It cannot be applied to Brigaded divisions formed from other units because of the break in sequence; the result of IMBs retaining their original code numbers when expanded to Divisions.

NAMES OF UNIT COMMANDERS

1. Use of names of Commander in Operations Orders.

Units are often referred to by using the Commander's name, i.e., Yamada Butai, Kusaba Butai, etc. For this reason, a complete officers' roster is maintained in an alphabetical card filing system. All current changes from documents and other sources are posted on these cards so they give not only the officer's present assignment, but as far as possible, all his previous assignments.

a. Abbreviations of Commanders' Names

In operations orders especially, Division Commanders' names are used, usually in abbreviated form. For instance, Yama Operations Order would be the 3rd Division since Yama is the abbreviated form for Yamamoto who is the current commander of the 3rd Division.

Here again, it is important to have the date of the information in case a change in assignment has occurred for the officer.

ACTUAL NUMERICAL DESIGNATIONS OF UNITS

1. All units are given numerical designations, i.e., 1st Div, 2d Div, 1st Inf Regt, etc. This is especially true for combat units.

a. Exceptions.

Some garrisons, some Armies and many line of communication units are named instead of numbered, i.e., Burma Area Army, Ogasawara Force, Enauke Fortress, Borneo Garrison Army, Kuriles Garrison, etc.

2. Necessity for correctly reporting units by numerical designations.

If units are correctly reported, it is necessary only to properly record the information.

a. Similar type units with different organizations and military nomenclature.

Most difficulty is experienced with Anti-Aircraft units and shipping units because of the similarity in nomenclature. There are Ind AA Arty Units, Ind AA Arty Cos, Ind AA Arty Bns, Ind AA Arty Regts (independent Regts in the sense that they are not divisional), as well as Field Anti-Aircraft Units. Fd AA Arty Bns, Ind Fd AA Arty Cos, and Naval AA Units.

JAP ARTILLERY TACTICS IN THE DEFENSE OF IWO JIMA

Mortars:

- 22 - 90mm or 150mm Mortars
- 12 - "Artillery Mortars", possibly 150mm Mortars or 32cm spigot mortars.

Rockets and Launchers:

At least 3 types of rocket propelled projectiles were used by the rocket units. The number of launchers that were present is not known.

A 20cm (8 inch) rocket, weighing approximately 190 lb was an adaptation of an 8-inch naval shell. This rocket was spin stabilized and had a maximum range of approximately 2000 yds. It was fired from a mortar-tube-like launcher approximately 10½ feet long which was mounted on 2 wheels.

Two types of bombs, 63 kg (132 lb) and 250 kg (550 lb), equipped with rocket motors, were fired from trough type launchers. The range of the 63 kg bomb was estimated to be 2000 yds while the estimated range of the 250 kg bomb was 5000 yds.

In addition to the above listed weapons there were a number of 70mm howitzers and mortars of smaller caliber. The role of these weapons was primarily one of close support for infantry.

On D-day heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on the beach areas throughout the day and followed our troops as they moved inland. This fire was well coordinated and accurate and caused heavy casualties. All landing beaches were subjected to heavy fire which was particularly intense near the center of the beach area. Several barrages which swept from Airfield No 1 down to the beaches were reported. Most of this fire originated in the Mt SURIBACHI area and in the rough terrain just SE of MOTOYAMA Airfield No 2.

Following D-day the front lines were subjected to almost continuous artillery and mortar fire which slowed and at times stopped altogether the advance of our troops. The rear areas were also shelled frequently and the beaches continued to be subjected to artillery and mortar fire which gradually diminished in frequency and volume as our front lines advanced.

The first report of any considerable overall reduction in enemy artillery fire was on D/ 4 when it was reported that enemy artillery was much diminished in volume during the day. However, on the following day (D/5), it was reported that enemy artillery was much increased over the previous period.

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BRIEFS

TECHNIQUE OF SURRENDER

Jap PW taken on LUZON was of the opinion that it is very difficult for the men to surrender during daylight hours, as others (Japs) may kill them. Therefore, he advised that men should be told in the broadcast to break away at night from the unit in small groups and then surrender early the following day.
(SWPA Daily Summary No 1092, 23/24 Mar 45) (SECRET)

Our forces continued to receive effective fire both on front lines and rear areas on subsequent days. This fire became less frequent and decreased in intensity as the enemy's communications were disrupted, his OP's were overrun, and his guns were knocked out.

By D+ 10 Jap artillery was apparently badly disorganized. Fire had become sporadic and largely ineffective.

It is worthy of note that artillery and mortars fired heavy preparations for local counter-attacks on at least two occasions during this operation. This seems to indicate an unusual degree of infantry-artillery cooperation.

On several occasions the Japs used time fire from dual purpose guns against our rear areas and against our tank-escorting infantry. No time fire from other artillery was reported.

Shrapnel was used to some extent but was largely ineffective due to the fact that it was impact fuzed and the soft volcanic ash had a blanketing effect on the burst. In this connection it is interesting to note that Major HIRAKUSHI, Takashi (alias YOSHIDA, Kiyoshi), captured on SAIPAN, stated that ricochet and time fire although taught at the artillery school, are seldom used in the field because time fuzes are hard to get. PW further states that no artillery time fuzes had been made for over a year. (See CINCPAC-CINCPOL Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No 86)

The coordination, volume and accuracy of the fire received by our forces, particularly during the initial phases of the operation, gave the impression that the fires of batteries and battalions were being massed in the manner of US artillery practice. Such a massing of fires would have been a new departure in Jap artillery tactics. A study of all available information from captured documents, reports of units which took part in the operation, and other sources, reveals no evidence that enemy artillery fire was massed. On the contrary, it is indicated that the result of massed fire was achieved as a result of prior registration on critical terrain features and check points.

According to a document dated 28 January 1945, which was captured by the 5th Marine Division on IWO, Col GUIDO was in command of all artillery on the island. Col GUIDO may have been the commander of the 109th Division Artillery, although there is no evidence to support this speculation. Under the command of Col GUIDO five artillery groups were organized which were designated according to their geographical location. Each of these five provisional groups was commanded by a group commander. Centralized control of all artillery on an island has not been encountered previously in this area.

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BRIEFS

OLD SALTS

Lights in KOWLOON were off for one night. A press report stated that saboteurs had put salt in the accumulators (CHINA light and Power Station). S.E.A.T.I.C. Interrogation Bulletin No 19, 2 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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CG, AAF/POA, APO 234	3	CG, 4th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
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CG, Seventh Air Force, APO 244	5	% FPO, S.F., Cal	1
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